1. सिद्दिशी युद्ध (सन 1682) :

Among the many enemies Sambhaji faced, it was against three maritime powers that he fought most persistently: the Siddi of Janjira, the Portuguese of Goa, and the Mughal Badshah himself. Of these, the Siddi's stronghold lay closest of all, pressed right up against Sambhaji's own capital of Raigad. The chronicler Sabhasad's verdict on this enemy has become proverbial: "As a rat is to a house, so was the Siddi to the Maharaja's kingdom" — a small, gnawing, ever-present menace impossible to root out entirely. Let us first trace how Sambhaji's dealings with this troublesome neighbor unfolded, before turning to the other two. The Siddi of Janjira was nominally a vassal of the Mughal Badshah, but in practice he depended for his safety on the protection of the English at Bombay, and it was on the strength of that shelter that he was able to keep Raigad under constant threat. Against him, and against Aurangzeb in person, and against the Portuguese of Goa, Sambhaji waged a relentless struggle for years on end — a struggle in which his courage, daring and sheer tenacity showed to full advantage. European writers such as Orme and Niccolao Manucci have left abundant accounts of his campaigns and expeditions in many quarters, and from their pages it is clear how deep a dread of Sambhaji had settled upon his enemies. The common charge levelled by the bakhar-writers — that lost in wine, women and the hunt, Sambhaji idled away his days around Panhala and Vishalgad while his kingdom went unattended — simply does not square with the facts. He fought innumerable adversaries with unflagging energy and made his power felt throughout the region; he understood Konkan politics thoroughly. What he lacked was the breadth of vision to survey the wider world beyond it: every one of his exploits was confined to the Konkan, and it was in the Konkan, in the end, that he met his death.

1. सिद्दिशी युद्ध (सन 1682) :

The moment he arrived in the Deccan, Aurangzeb's mind swelled with grand ambitions. He resolved to carry to completion the dream his ancestors had cherished of a single unbroken empire stretching from Kabul to Kanyakumari, and he was confident that the vast military and financial resources of his empire, joined to his own extraordinary shrewdness, would allow him to crush the Maratha kingdom once and for all and set the seal on his empire's permanence. Even as he pursued this design, he had left his wazir Asad Khan and his grandson Azimushshan to guard the roads through Rajputana. Along every route by which Sambhaji or Akbar might move, he stationed his ablest commanders at post after post, and to keep himself informed of their movements day by day, he scattered a vast network of spies everywhere. His gaze roamed restlessly in every direction: subduing his rebellious son, destroying the Maratha kingdom, extinguishing the Adilshahi and Qutbshahi — all these aims churned in his mind at once, and his preparations at this time were so formidable that it seemed to everyone he was about to "trample the whole earth underfoot." He also meant to bring the English of Surat and Bombay and the Portuguese of Goa to heel, and toward that end he first won over the Siddi of Janjira, built up his fleet, and set him loose against Sambhaji. With this mighty backing secured, all three of the maritime powers stood ready to devour Sambhaji's kingdom between them, and negotiations began among themselves. Of the three, only the English remained wary enough to avoid openly declaring themselves Sambhaji's enemies. Since all three lay in close proximity to his territory, Sambhaji could not afford to overlook any of them. In such straits the ordinary rule of statecraft — make peace with one adversary while fighting another — was one that Sambhaji neither grasped nor managed to apply; instead he found himself at war with all of them simultaneously, a direct consequence of the Badshah's aggression. The Siddi's bases lay at three points — Janjira, Bombay and Surat — and on occasion he ranged as far south as Goa itself. At Surat sat a Mughal subedar, to whom the Badshah sent orders that the jizya be collected strictly from all Hindus, and that the customs levied on the English and other traders be raised. With this backing from the Badshah, the Siddi began to run riot in Sambhaji's territory.

1. सिद्दिशी युद्ध (सन 1682) :

By day the Siddi cruised openly at sea; in the monsoon he sheltered at the English port of Majgaon, and from there he launched stealthy raids into the Kurla and Kalyan districts, harrying the lands Shivaji Maharaj had once ruled. He seized people from Maratha territory and sold them as slaves at Bombay. When Sambhaji lodged a complaint with the English through his vakil over this, the English rebuked the Siddi and extracted from him a written promise not to trouble Maratha territory again. Yet in August 1680, as two hundred Marathas were on their way to Khanderi, Siddi Qasim seized eighty of them, cut off their heads, and carried on to Bombay. Sambhaji at once sent Avji Pandit to demand an explanation from the English, and Avji, on meeting Sambhaji, reported the whole affair to him. In the summer of 1681 several skirmishes took place between Siddi Qasim and Sambhaji's naval commander Daulatkhan; with the onset of the monsoon, Siddi Qasim withdrew to Surat. While this was under way, Aurangzeb made thorough preparations for the subjugation of the Marathas, and sent reinforcements to the Siddi with peremptory orders to sail his fleet against Sambhaji. On learning this, Sambhaji redoubled his own preparations. He readied his entire navy for battle — some hundred and fifty large and small vessels, manned by five thousand seasoned sailors. His chief admiral was Daulatkhan, and serving under him was the son of Mainak Bhandari. In addition, the son and nephew of Siddi Sambal — the nephew being one Siddi Mistri — two formidable seafaring warriors, deserted the Siddi's service and came over to Sambhaji, where they too served diligently under Daulatkhan. It was at this juncture that Shahzada Akbar arrived to take refuge with Sambhaji, which only sharpened the intensity of the conflict. In December 1681 the Siddi devastated the Maratha coast from Panvel all the way to Chaul. Sambhaji at once took Akbar with him and marched by land against Janjira with twenty thousand troops.

1. सिद्दिशी युद्ध (सन 1682) :

In this campaign Sambhaji relied heavily on Dadaji Raghunath Prabhu, the deshpande of Mahad who had already won renown in the earlier battle of Belvandi, and who was thoroughly familiar with the western coastline. Sambhaji promised him, "If you bring about the Siddi's downfall, we will grant you a place among our Ashtapradhan," and Dadaji sailed off with the fleet to lay siege to Janjira. Alongside this, Sambhaji dispatched a trusted agent of his, Khandoji Farzand, to Janjira with instructions to feign a quarrel with Sambhaji and enter the Siddi's service as a mole. But Khandoji's ruse was betrayed to the Siddi through one of his maidservants, and the Siddi promptly seized and executed Khandoji and his associates. Meanwhile, by land and by sea, the Marathas kept up their assault on Janjira and, in the early months of 1682, inflicted considerable damage on it; yet the fort itself remained beyond their reach, for Siddi Qasim conducted its defense with great cunning. Sambhaji then adopted the plan of filling in the creek around the island fortress to build a causeway across which an assault could be launched. But just as this scheme was under way, the Badshah's armies began advancing, and Sambhaji was compelled to leave the reduction of Janjira in the hands of Dadaji and his colleagues while he himself turned to confront the Mughals. Dadaji, for his part, pressed the siege with all his strength. But when the monsoon broke, the pounding surf made further operations impossible, and the Marathas were forced to lift the siege, losing two hundred men to the Siddi in the process. Once the rains eased, Sambhaji renewed the attack, striking at the Siddi's fleet off Majgaon — but here too the Marathas suffered defeat, and their chief admiral, Siddi Mistri, fell into enemy hands. Left with no other recourse, the Marathas were forced to scuttle several of their own vessels in the water rather than let them fall to the enemy. It was in the course of this campaign that Sambhaji came to understand that the principal support sustaining the Siddi came from the Portuguese of Goa, and that the Siddi could never be brought down until that support was cut off. He therefore turned his attention first to the Portuguese, and for the time being called off his offensive against the Siddi.

1. सिद्दिशी युद्ध (सन 1682) :

The English, for their part, never adopted a policy of provoking Sambhaji. On one hand, their superiors had given them strict orders not to make an enemy of anyone; on the other, Sambhaji too avoided picking quarrels that would force him to fight too many adversaries at once. On the contrary, in order to strengthen his friendship with the English, he sent his own vakil to them at Bombay. He informed the English that the Badshah had resolved to seize Bombay, Vasai, Daman and other such places, and that should this succeed, great harm would come to Maratha territory as well; it was therefore in both their interests to maintain a friendly understanding sufficient for mutual protection. He asked that they not allow the Siddi's or the Mughal fleet to enter Bombay harbor, offering his own navy's assistance in this, and requested that, should these terms be acceptable, they send their own vakil back with his to confirm the agreement. At this same time, the Madras English, wishing to establish several factories in the territory near Jinji that Shivaji Maharaj had once conquered in Karnatak, had written to their counterparts at Bombay asking them to obtain Sambhaji's permission. To settle both matters at once, on 20 December 1682 the English vakil set out for Raigad together with Sambhaji's own vakil; en route, Mughal warships attacked their boat and plundered it. The vakil nevertheless made his way to Sambhaji and secured an audience. Sambhaji granted the Madras English their request regarding Jinji, but, fearing to provoke the Badshah's wrath, declined to conclude any permanent treaty with the English; and while the treaty papers were still being drawn up, the English vakil abruptly departed and returned to Bombay. Around this same period, a serious mutiny broke out within the English administration, and it proved, quite by chance, to work entirely to Sambhaji's advantage — for had it not occurred, the triple alliance of the Siddi, the English and the Portuguese might well have proved too formidable for him. In 1683-84 an Englishman named Richard Keigwin arrived in India and raised a rebellion against the Company. Many resented the fact that "the island of Bombay, though it belonged to the King of England, had passed into the Company's possession." Keigwin arrived, imprisoned the Company's President on 27 December 1683, and seized control of Bombay; and the Siddi's and Mughal fleets, which had until then been landing unhindered at Bombay, he now drove away. This development, too, worked directly to Sambhaji's benefit. Keigwin, seeking to cultivate friendship with Sambhaji, sent two envoys — Captain Gary and Lieutenant Wilkins — to him in April 1684, accompanied by an interpreter, Ram Shenvi. This embassy proved highly successful: two agreements were concluded between Sambhaji and the English that benefited both sides, and for fifty years thereafter the English never crossed the Marathas' path. Ramchandrapant Amatya records of this period: "The country of Janjira and the like, the jagir of Shyamal [the Siddi], was thoroughly ravaged and ruined. The hostility of the Tamras [Portuguese] was checked, and the outside support that might have come from that quarter was forestalled."

2. संभाजीराजांपुढे बहादूरखानाची धावपळ (स.1681) -

At the time of Shivaji's death, war with the Mughals was still in full swing. Aurangzeb's armies had marched off into Rajputana, and his eldest son Shah Alam, who had been stationed in the Deccan, was recalled to join that campaign; in his place the Badshah sent back Khan Jahan, also known as Bahadurkhan. The fort of Ahivant, near Chandwad, which Shivaji had earlier seized, was besieged by Bahadurkhan the moment he arrived (July 1680); but the monsoon soon forced him to raise the siege and encamp nearby instead. The moment Dasara arrived, Sambhaji dispatched his own army against the Mughals and spread word that he intended to plunder Surat and Burhanpur — whereupon Bahadurkhan abandoned Baglan and retreated. Just then, orders reached him from the Badshah to capture Shahzada Akbar, who had risen in rebellion. A rumour that Aurangzeb himself had been deposed threw the countryside into turmoil and gave the Marathas fresh heart. Hambirrao Mohite plundered Dharangaon and marched on Burhanpur at a moment when the Mughal garrison was away; Burhanpur's faujdar was seized with panic, and for three days Hambirrao made no headway against the city's strong walls. As soon as word of this reached Bahadurkhan, he raced by way of the Fardapur pass to the relief of Burhanpur, his army enduring severe hardship on the march. When word reached Hambirrao that the Khan was closing in, he gathered up all his plunder and withdrew by way of Chopda and Erandol to the safety of Salher. Khan Jahan's failure to offer any resistance to this raid earned him a sharp rebuke from the Badshah.

2. संभाजीराजांपुढे बहादूरखानाची धावपळ (स.1681) -

Bahadurkhan subsequently returned to keep watch on the Marathas and encamped near Babhulgaon, when word reached him that "a second, larger Maratha army is advancing by way of Ahmednagar and Paithan." He at once rushed to the defence of Aurangabad. The city's wealthy inhabitants were gripped with terror; a Mughal officer named Anupsingh Rathod, who held the city, kept order within the walls, while the townsfolk shut their houses and stood ready for the worst. Bahadurkhan arrived in time (February 1681) to reassure everyone. When Aurangzeb learned of this, he had a new and formidable wall built around the city, a project that took two full years to complete. Meanwhile Sambhaji's men, moving in small bands, ranged across Mughal territory laying it waste. In July 1681 Netaji Palkar entered Baglan and, once Dasara had passed, began raiding beyond it; Bahadurkhan sent troops against him. This was also the time (October 1681) that Sambhaji attempted to rescue his wife and daughter, who had been captured by Dilerkhan and held prisoner in the fort of Ahmednagar. Afterward Maratha forces marched on Solapur, with Bahadurkhan hurrying after them to save the city; another Maratha force meanwhile advanced toward Salher-Mulher, pursued by Shihabuddinkhan. In this fashion, for a year and a half, Sambhaji and the Mughals kept up this running, breathless contest of marches and skirmishes — until at last the Badshah himself came down to the Deccan and took personal charge of the war that followed.

3. संभाजीराजांचा पोर्तुगिझांशी झगडा, पूर्ववप्रकोप :-

From the very outset, Sambhaji's attention was fixed above all on keeping control of the western coastline, and it was here that some of his sharpest conflicts with the Siddi and the Portuguese took place. He came within a hair's breadth of success — had matters gone only slightly differently, Goa itself might have fallen into his hands and Portuguese rule there been swept away entirely. Before recounting that struggle, however, it is necessary first to explain how the estrangement between Sambhaji and the Portuguese came about. Shivaji had established Maratha power and secured the western coast, and in doing so had put a considerable check on the free movement of the three Western powers — the Portuguese, the Siddi and the English — who accordingly never missed an opportunity to make trouble for the Marathas whenever one arose. The Maratha capital at Raigad exerted heavy pressure on the Siddi of Janjira in particular, who in due course became the naval agent of the Mughal Badshah himself. Undermining Maratha religion and trade was a constant shared objective of both the Siddi and the Portuguese, and in this they always assisted one another readily. In 1681, when Shahzada Akbar rose against his father and took refuge with Sambhaji in the Konkan, a genuinely difficult situation arose for everyone. The Badshah issued stern orders to all: give Akbar no shelter, hand him over, allow Mughal troops free passage through your territory, supply them with grain and ammunition, and render whatever assistance the sea-lanes required — and he threatened severe punishment for anyone who disobeyed. This threat placed the coastal maritime powers in a genuinely precarious position. Sambhaji, for his part, sheltered Akbar at Pali and opened war on the Mughals; in response he too warned the Siddi, the Portuguese and the English that they must render no assistance to the Mughals, supply them with nothing, and remain strictly neutral — or else, he warned, he would show them no mercy and would exact his revenge in full. Caught thus between two formidable powers, the three lesser ones found themselves, as the saying goes, "between the devil and the deep sea," and each acted from moment to moment as circumstances seemed to require. Of the three, the English alone remained entirely neutral. The Siddi, being the Badshah's own servant, had no choice but to supply the Mughals from Surat and elsewhere — for which Sambhaji retaliated by striking directly at Janjira. The Portuguese, meanwhile, maintained ties with both sides at once, so that until their interference was stopped, it was impossible for Sambhaji to carry on his war against the Badshah unhindered. Beyond this general estrangement, however, a further series of specific grievances accumulated between the two sides, which may be set out as follows.

3. संभाजीराजांचा पोर्तुगिझांशी झगडा, पूर्ववप्रकोप :-

First, Shivaji had earlier seized the port of Karwar, at whose mouth lies a small island called Anjadiv, set out in the open sea at a strategic point. Shivaji's plan had been to build a sea-fort there, on the model of Sindhudurg, to secure the coast; recognising that the spot was well placed to threaten Portuguese Goa, Sambhaji sent his own subhedar there and began fortifying it. In response, the Portuguese governor at Goa dispatched warships from Goa and seized Anjadiv outright (17 April 1682), building his own fortification on it — a development that naturally rankled deeply with Sambhaji. Second, the Portuguese had at first sincerely wished to avoid deepening their enmity with Sambhaji. Francisco de Tavora, Count of Alvor, who served as Goa's governor from 1681 to 1686, was determined to defend Goa by every means available, out of fear that Sambhaji might one day seize it and rise against Portuguese rule there. On 28 July 1682 he wrote to Sambhaji congratulating him on the birth of his son (Shahu). Sambhaji's vakil at Goa, Yesaji Gambhirrao, had meanwhile requested a supply of gunpowder materials from the governor, to which Tavora replied: "Yesaji Gambhirrao delivered your letter to us. We have need of saltpetre and sulphur for the manufacture of gunpowder at Bicholim and Kudal, and would ask that you supply us these at a fair price; and that you not obstruct our vessels bringing gunpowder materials and provisions from Karwar and Malabar to Vengurla and Banda. We have taken note of your wishes and have given our officers instructions accordingly. Our officers, however, complain that your officials do not show us the same courtesy — you have detained our merchant vessels in north Konkan, which is not right. All these vessels should be released, and no manner of obstruction offered to our territory; we would ask you to issue a firm order to this effect to all your officials. It is our wish to preserve our friendship with you, but should your officials continue to trouble us, this friendship cannot be expected to last — this much we feel bound to point out to you in brief." Around this same time a Portuguese trading vessel bound for Surat was seized by the Marathas off Chaul, and its entire cargo carried off and impounded at the port of Kase; the governor's complaint over this incident deepened the estrangement between the two sides still further.

3. संभाजीराजांचा पोर्तुगिझांशी झगडा, पूर्ववप्रकोप :-

Third, before the Portuguese arrival in India, the whole of the foreign trade along the Malabar and African coasts had lain in the hands of Arab merchants, who were themselves highly skilled seafarers. The Portuguese had appropriated the whole of this lucrative trade for themselves, and a lasting enmity had grown up between the two as a result. When Sambhaji began to suffer at the hands of the Siddi and the Portuguese, he enlisted these very Arabs and, under his protection, allowed them to set up trading posts in his ports. The damage the Arabs then inflicted on Portuguese trade, sheltered as they were by Sambhaji, roused the Portuguese to fresh anger against him. Fourth, in 1682 the Mughals seized Sambhaji's northern Konkan territory and made Kalyan their chief garrison there. Sambhaji surrounded the Mughal forces from every side and put Kalyan under heavy siege; but the Portuguese brought in provisions by ship and thereby saved the Mughals — had that grain not reached him, the Mughal commander Ranmustakhan would have found himself in dire straits indeed (December 1682). Seeing his carefully laid plan undone in this fashion by the Portuguese, Sambhaji grew furious and resolved in his heart to teach them a proper lesson. Fifth, once Shahzada Akbar had taken refuge with Sambhaji at Pali, Mughal forces followed close on his heels, and to resist them Sambhaji found it necessary to keep the entire coastline from Surat to Karwar under his own control. He therefore decreed that no vessel, whether trading or fighting, might move along this coast without his own licence, and began issuing permits to all shipping accordingly. This, of course, put an end to Portuguese freedom of movement, and they too now resolved on war against Sambhaji. Sixth, to this already deteriorating situation, Akbar's own conduct added further fuel. He went to the vicinity of Goa and began demanding Portuguese ships to carry him onward to Iran. To give them would provoke the Badshah's wrath; to refuse would provoke Sambhaji's — and caught in this dilemma, the Portuguese found themselves in an impossible position, when in the summer of 1683 Sambhaji himself laid siege to Chaul, the chief Portuguese post near Raigad — and from that point onward, open war broke out between the two sides. In the course of this war, only two engagements proved truly fierce, though both were brief: first the siege of Chaul, and later the siege of Fonda. At Chaul, Sambhaji met with failure; at Fonda, it was the Portuguese who failed.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

The Jedhe Shakawali records, under the date Jyeshtha vadya 11 (10 June 1683): "Sambhaji Raje rode out and went to Rajapur. He broke with the Feringhis [Portuguese] and laid siege to Revdanda [Chaul]." At this same time, Sambhaji sent swift bands of horsemen into Portuguese territory from Vasai to Daman, burning and plundering as they went. The siege of Chaul itself was entrusted to Peshwa Nilopant, who made numerous attempts to take the place, all in vain. On the night of 8 August 1683 the Marathas launched a fierce assault on Chaul's walls, but the Portuguese defenders cut down a great many of the attackers. Nearby stood the fort of Korlai, also in Portuguese hands; the Marathas raided this too, and again suffered heavy casualties without gaining the place.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

So much for the war in the north. Let us now turn to what took place at Goa itself. The Italian traveller Niccolao Manucci happened to be at Goa at this time, and his eyewitness account of events proves invaluable. Letters from Aurangzeb, borne by his own vakil, reached Governor Francisco de Tavora at Goa, filling the governor with great delight; he had Manucci translate the Badshah's letter for him. In January 1683 Shahzada Akbar, together with Durgadas, arrived at Banda — a place on the border of Goa that lay within Sambhaji's territory, where Sambhaji maintained a residence and garden. Akbar's plan was to secure passage on Portuguese ships to Iran, and to this end he sent his vakil, Abdul Rahim Khan, to call on Governor Tavora. The vakil and the governor met on 17 January 1683, and in this meeting the vakil told the governor: "There is no possibility of reconciliation between our master and Sambhaji Raje, and he has resolved to leave the Deccan altogether. In this matter we need your assistance. I have brought with me some valuable jewels; please purchase these from us and give us their worth, and arrange passage for our journey." The two men talked the matter over, and Governor Tavora sent the vakil back with a written reply conveying his intentions. This reply, dated 19 January 1683, read in substance: "We were gladdened to receive the letter your vakil brought us. It grieves us deeply to learn from him of the severe hardships and difficulties you are enduring. He has communicated several matters to us, in respect of which we shall gladly do whatever lies within our power. We have discussed the whole matter fully with your vakil, who will report it to you. Be assured that we shall spare no effort in carrying out whatever service you require of us."

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

The very day after the governor wrote this letter, one Sheikh Mahmud, a vakil of Aurangzeb's, arrived at Goa — and with his arrival, it became impossible for the governor to offer Akbar any further assistance. Akbar then informed the governor: "Convey us to Mangalore, and from there we shall proceed onward to Mecca." Accordingly, on 13 February 1683 the governor ordered that five vessels be placed at Akbar's disposal, and sent him a further reply: "We were gladdened to receive your letter. You were pleased to send us, as a gift, your own jewel-studded dagger, for which we are profoundly grateful. We are sending you, along with the vakil, a number of articles as listed in the enclosed inventory; kindly accept them. We have explained everything fully to your vakil. Orders have been issued that five vessels be provided to you from our factory at Mangalore. Let your men take these orders, collect our boat at Panjim, and make the further arrangements. As soon as your men arrive, the boat shall be sent." All of this negotiating, however, came to the notice of Sheikh Mahmud, Aurangzeb's vakil then residing at Goa, who at once wrote to the Badshah and had him send a sharp rebuke to the governor. He also lost no time in alerting Siddi Yaqut, the Janjira chief who commanded the Mughal fleet, telling him: "Akbar is fleeing in this manner — you must intercept him."

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

Governor Tavora, caught between managing his ties to Akbar on one side and to Aurangzeb on the other, found himself in real difficulty, and his chief anxiety now was to avoid drawing down the Badshah's wrath upon himself. He therefore wrote a carefully conciliatory letter to the Badshah, dated 12 April 1683, whose substance ran as follows: "Sheikh Mahmud, sent by Your Majesty, has arrived and reported to us. Even before his arrival, however, messengers and letters had already come to us from Your Majesty's son, Shahzada Akbar, in which he stated, 'Help us to escape from this land of infidels.' Subsequently the Janjira chief, Siddi Yaqut Khan, informed us: 'Shahzada Akbar is fleeing in defiance of the Badshah's authority; you are on no account to assist him in any way.' Letters to the same effect reached us also from Your Majesty's sardars Bahadurkhan and Lutfullah Khan. The Shahzada has, in truth, no means whatsoever of escaping from here — his circumstances have become so reduced that, to meet his daily needs, he has been obliged to send some of his own jewels to us for sale. In this matter we have rendered him no assistance of any kind. Yet he is, after all, Your Majesty's own son; had he approached us and we had chosen to insult him, that too would surely have provoked Your Majesty's displeasure against us. When so great a personage seeks our shelter, how would it become our own honour to treat him with contempt? We understand full well that Your Majesty's anger at his rebellion is only natural; and yet it seems to us that it would become Your Majesty to overlook the faults of this brave and noble prince and grant him pardon, and to turn his talents instead to the conquest of Your Majesty's enemies. Should Your Majesty's command reach us to this effect, we too shall gladly act as intermediary and bring about a reconciliation between you. This, surely, is the course most fitting for one as great as Your Majesty."

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

After sending this conciliatory letter to the Badshah, the governor no longer had any means of assisting Akbar further; he did, however, continue to keep the Shahzada informed of developments on every side and warn him to remain on his guard. On 16 April 1683 a letter reached him from Siddi Yaqut of Janjira, reporting that he had come to Rajapur with the intention of capturing the Shahzada — news which the governor duly passed on to Akbar at Banda. Akbar thereupon left Banda and moved into Portuguese territory at Bicholim, where he remained encamped through September 1683. From there, fearing that the Siddi would seize him should he attempt to travel onward to Mangalore, he abandoned that plan and instead asked the governor to provide him a Portuguese ship directly from Goa to carry him to Iran — a request the governor could not possibly grant. In a letter to Sheikh Mahmud dated 23 October 1683, the governor writes: "We did not give the Shahzada the vessels he requested. He therefore purchased a small private vessel of his own, intending to take it to Rajapur and sail from there to Mecca. He accordingly went to Rajapur for this purpose; but upon actually inspecting the vessel, he concluded that it would not survive the voyage safely, and we understand that he has abandoned that plan. He is presently within Maratha territory." Subsequently Sambhaji and the Shahzada quarrelled once again. At one point the two of them had jointly planned to march together and strike at the Badshah's own encampment; for this Sambhaji requested funds, and Akbar gave him some of his jewels. But when the preparations were slow in coming together, Akbar grew disgusted and, in high dudgeon, abandoned Sambhaji and went off to Vengurla, where he purchased a ship and was on the point of setting sail. At this juncture Sambhaji's minister Kavikalash went aboard to meet him and said: "Your withdrawal in this fit of anger has caused Sambhaji Raje great sorrow. His message to you is this: return to us; we shall place our entire army under your command; together let us march against the Badshah and bring about his downfall; and once victory is won, you shall be free to go wherever you please." This episode occurred around 23 November 1683. Akbar was persuaded, and thereafter proceeded to Sambhaji's fort of Bhimgad. But before recounting what followed from this, we must first go back and relate the story of Sambhaji's assault on Goa, which took place at this very time.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

The Badshah, through his vakil, had sent the Portuguese governor a letter to this effect: "You are free to conquer Sambhaji's territory as you please; we shall grant it to you. Drive him out of his own lands; supply him with no gunpowder or provisions whatsoever. And should you find some means to capture or kill him, you will have rendered us a very great service." Thus encouraged, how could the governor sit idle? Indeed, the mere fact that the Badshah had sent him a vakil at all seemed to the governor a great honour. Manucci, however, warned him bluntly: "Place no trust whatsoever in the Badshah's word. The Marathas are far better neighbours for you than the Badshah is. It is only the wall of the Sahyadris that protects you as things stand. Provoke Sambhaji's enmity, and you will not survive even a moment." Manucci went on to give the governor a full account of the state of Indian politics as he understood it — but none of this made much impression on him. The Portuguese had already been harassing Sambhaji so persistently in the Konkan that he was thoroughly enraged with them, and he was actively preparing to teach them a sharp lesson, when Akbar's taking refuge at Goa became the immediate cause of the final rupture between the two sides. Carpenters, blacksmiths and other craftsmen had gone to Goa from Akbar's party to build his ships, and along with them a number of Sambhaji's own agents slipped into Goa in various disguises, gathering full intelligence of the state of affairs within the city. As the Maratha presence in Goa steadily grew, Manucci grew suspicious that something was afoot, and warned the governor accordingly. Meanwhile Sambhaji's own agents, with the deliberate aim of luring the governor into disgrace, planted the rumour: "Sambhaji Raje has accumulated a great treasure at Fonda; attack it and the treasure will be yours." The governor's mouth watered at this, and he resolved to launch an assault on Fonda; he mustered every man in Goa, arming even the priests, and made ready for war, determined to complete his stroke before word of it could reach Sambhaji. To that end he loaded some of Goa's local people onto boats and, on 29 August, sent them to plunder and burn Sambhaji's territory near the Terekhol creek — but this rabble of camp-followers did no real harm whatsoever to Sambhaji's territory.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

Manucci understood Sambhaji's movements and true strength far better than the governor did. Through French merchants resident at Rajapur, Manucci learned of Sambhaji's secret designs, and once again he cautioned the governor: "Do not let yourself be drawn into an assault on Fonda. Do not go out of your way to provoke the Marathas. Proceed with great caution and try to secure a settlement." But the governor had placed great hope in the backing of the Mughal Badshah. Shah Alam was on the march with a mighty army, and the governor reasoned that with this opportunity at hand, a bold stroke now would win him Fonda for good. Resolved on the attack, he sent Akbar's now-ready ship on to Vengurla and, on 17 October 1683, set out from Goa with eight hundred Europeans, eight thousand Kanadi infantry, and five heavy cannon. On the fifth day he arrived at the foot of Fonda's walls — Fonda being a water-fort. For four days he subjected Fonda to a furious cannonade, and a small breach was finally opened in the wall. But as the Portuguese began pressing through it, Sambhaji's garrison fought back with tremendous ferocity, killing great numbers of the attackers and utterly repulsing the assault. Just then, word of the Portuguese attack reached Sambhaji at Chaul, and he came racing to the relief of Fonda with such speed that the Portuguese found themselves caught in a pincer between his forces outside and the fort's defenders within — a moment of extreme peril for them. To make matters worse, rain soaked their gunpowder and rendered their muskets useless. The greater part of the Portuguese force was cut to pieces, and Governor Tavora, having suffered a crushing and humiliating defeat, crossed the creek on 1 November 1683 and saved his own life only with the greatest difficulty, barely managing to reach Goa. So ashamed was he of this needless disaster of his own making that he could not bring himself to show his face in public, and shut himself away for many days in a friar's monastery. Throughout Goa, every household was draped in grief and mourning.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

Had Sambhaji pressed his advantage at once, the city of Goa itself would have fallen into his hands then and there. Instead, he first secured and consolidated his hold on Fonda before turning to march on Goa. He first seized the Bardesh district to the north and the Salcete district to the south of Goa; then, on 24 November 1683, he captured the two fortified points of Kumbharjuve and St. Estevam, both barely two miles from Goa itself. Gathering up all the boats in the vicinity, he made himself fully ready to enter the Portuguese capital in person. Seeing this, the officials of Goa and its leading citizens were seized with utter terror; they gathered in the great and splendid church of St. Francis Xavier and began imploring divine mercy. For several days they kept up prayer and devotion without pause, day and night, with a single supplication: "O Lord, this kingdom is Yours; You created it, and it is now for You alone to preserve its honour." On the final night, once the governor and the entire body of clergy had finished their prayers in the church, they lit candles, opened the saint's tomb, and the governor laid before it the royal sceptre and the charter of sovereignty. In the hope that through the saint's miraculous power and grace Goa might be spared, he drew up and presented a deed proclaiming that "the entire burden of this kingdom is placed, in the name of the King of Portugal, in the keeping of the saint." He then turned to the portrait of St. Francis Xavier and, with tear-filled eyes and grieving sighs, begged for his mercy. Every human resource of courage and daring had by now been exhausted; only the grace of God, it seemed, could avail them now, and it was in this spirit that they resorted to this final remedy against the calamity confronting them.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

And then — see what a marvel occurred! No sooner had the governor set down the sceptre and the deed of gift upon the altar and stepped back from that sacred spot than a joyful salvo of cannon-fire was heard outside, and word arrived that "the Marathas have abandoned St. Estevam island and withdrawn." Witnessing this seeming miracle, the Portuguese of Goa genuinely came to believe that St. Francis Xavier had, through his miraculous intercession, preserved their kingdom. In truth, however, matters had unfolded quite differently. The governor had gone to Manucci and begged him to visit Sambhaji and negotiate a treaty on the Portuguese behalf to save them. Manucci accordingly went and obtained an audience with Sambhaji, in the presence of Durgadas. In this meeting Sambhaji declared: "We are filled with fury that the governor made war upon us without any order from the King of Portugal." Drawing out his sword, Bhavani, he added: "Behold my sword — with this very blade I have severed the heads of my own rebels. Take this trusted man of mine with you and go settle a treaty with the governor." In this exchange, it was Sambhaji's own passion, more than calculated statecraft, that came through most clearly. Sambhaji had wished to send a thousand men to Goa along with his envoy, but Manucci intervened and persuaded him to abandon the idea. Sambhaji's vakil duly met with the governor, but no treaty was concluded at once: Sambhaji insisted on a permanent grant of the chauthai of the Goa province, a demand the governor would not accept, and the negotiations dragged on, a delay that worked entirely to the governor's advantage. Sambhaji, for his part, failed to strike while the iron was hot — as the saying goes, he did not bake his bread while the griddle was still warm. Meanwhile the Siddi's fleet, which had come to Vengurla, was summoned by the governor to his aid; and just then letters arrived from Aurangzeb assuring him, "Do not be afraid — our army is coming to your relief."

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

The Jedhe Shakawali notes, under the date Kartik vadya 7 (1 November 1683): "Sambhaji Raje went to Banda. The Goans had laid siege to the fort; he fought them off and lifted the siege. There, Yesaji Kank and his men, together with Krishnaji, fought to the utmost. In the month of Margashirsha, Kumbharjuve was taken. Salcete and Bardesh were ravaged." From this it is evident that all these events took place within roughly a month of the governor's initial attack on Fonda on 17 October. An urgent report then arrived — "Shah Alam is advancing against you" — and Sambhaji was forced to withdraw abruptly from Goa on 26 November 1683, delivering Goa from certain conquest. This turn of events was a bitter disappointment to Sambhaji, and it threw Akbar and Durgadas, too, into considerable anxiety. Sambhaji entrusted the task of negotiating a clever peace with the Portuguese, so as to safeguard Akbar, to Kalusha [Kavikalash], while he himself rushed off at once to confront Shah Alam. Kalusha hastened to Vengurla and secretly conducted Akbar and Durgadas to the fastness of Bhimgad, deep in the difficult terrain of the Sahyadris. This fort of Bhimgad, twenty-five miles north of Fonda and under Sambhaji's control, proved of great service in this critical moment. Akbar's own presence, too, was of considerable help to Kalusha in the ensuing negotiations. Kalusha sent his own agent, Rai Kirtisinh, to Goa; on 29 November 1683 Kirtisinh arrived there and met with the governor. After some discussion, the governor sent his own vakil, Manuel Saraiva de Albuquerque, back with Kirtisinh to Bhimgad to negotiate terms. There, with Akbar himself present to mediate, the terms were discussed clause by clause, and the main points were settled on 7 January 1684; further discussion over the precise wording of the draft followed, and the treaty was finally signed on 4 February 1684.

4. पोर्तुगिझांना अद्दल घडली (सन 1683-84) :

The substance of this treaty, so far as it survives, runs as follows: first, all territories, forts, ships, cannon and materials seized by either side since the outbreak of war were to be restored to their original owners; second, prisoners taken by each side were to be released to the other; third, the Portuguese were to pay Sambhaji the gavkhandi and chauthai dues from the Vasai and Daman talukas, and Sambhaji in turn was to guard that territory against any outside incursion; fourth, both sides were to be free to move through each other's territory for purposes of trade; and fifth, the Portuguese were not to allow gunpowder, grain or provisions of any kind to pass through their territory to the Badshah's army. The Jedhe Shakawali's account of this treaty is extremely brief: "Magh shuddha 1 (7 January 1684): Kavikalash took Akbar to Bhimgad and concluded peace with the Feringhis. Jyeshtha shuddha 15 (18 May 1684): Kalusha [Kavikalash] returned to Raigad." For their valour in the fighting at Fonda, Sambhaji rewarded Yesaji Kank and his son Krishnaji, and the letter recording this survives, bearing the seal of Sambhaji and Peshwa Nilo Moreshwar, dated 23 June 1685: "Letter of stipulated reward to Yesaji Kank, commander of infantry, and Krishnaji Yesaji Kank, infantry officer. The above-named and his son Krishnaji Kank, when they encountered the Feringhis on the Fonda campaign, exerted themselves to the utmost and cut down the enemy. In that engagement both were wounded and left shattered. His Majesty the Swami, seeing with his own eyes the severity of their wounds, gave orders that they be sent home. Thereafter Krishnaji Kank's wounds reopened and he died at home. Yesaji Kank has now come before us and reported these circumstances, whereupon His Majesty, moved to compassion — considering that this man has ever been devoted to the Swami's service through his exertions, and that his son too gave his life in the Swami's service — and since a reward for the Fonda campaign was already due, has fixed a stipulated reward of one thousand hon each of the Padshahi coinage, two thousand hon in all, to be paid as a one-time grant this year." The heavy admixture of Sanskrit vocabulary in this document is worth noting. This letter stands as testimony to Sambhaji's conscientious attention to the duties of kingship.

5. वाडीकर सावंताचा संभाजीराजांस विरोध (स.1685-86) :-

Although peace had now been concluded between Sambhaji and the Portuguese, Sambhaji had by no means abandoned his intention of teaching them a further lesson. He informed the governor: "We have incurred very heavy expense in the course of this war; you must therefore send us a firm tribute of one lakh hon, and you must also return to us the island of Anjadiv, which you have seized." The governor rejected these demands outright, and instead entered into an alliance against Sambhaji with Wadikar Khem Sawant. He wrote to Sawant: "We are neighbours, you and I. Sambhaji is a man of great cruelty, given to unjust conduct; bringing about his downfall serves both our interests equally." In this way Sawant, who had once lived under the protection of Shivaji Maharaj, now turned against Sambhaji and allied himself with the Portuguese. The treaty between the two was concluded on 8 February 1685, and contained the following provisions. First, the two allies were to wage war jointly against Sambhaji by both land and sea, in mutual consultation; of whatever territory was conquered between Banda and Ankola, one-third was to go to Sawant and two-thirds to the Portuguese. Second, in like manner, the Portuguese fleet was to assist Khem Sawant in conquering the territory from Kudal to Chaul, of which two-thirds would go to Sawant and one-third to the Portuguese. Third, whatever plunder was gained, after covering the expenses of the fleet, was to be given to Sawant. Fourth, the Portuguese fleet was to go to Sawant's aid, and the Portuguese would supply him with whatever gunpowder and materials he needed. Fifth, the Portuguese would use their good offices with the Mughal Badshah to secure employment for Sawant's men in Mughal service. Sixth, Sawant would enjoy full religious freedom within Portuguese territory. Seventh, the Portuguese were not to conclude any separate treaty with Sambhaji on their own account, and Sawant, for his part, was not to trouble the English, French, Dutch and other Europeans moving about in Sambhaji's territory. Eighth, should Sawant have need of funds once the war began, the Portuguese government would see to his support.

5. वाडीकर सावंताचा संभाजीराजांस विरोध (स.1685-86) :-

It seems likely that this uprising against Sambhaji was itself instigated by the Badshah. The moment the above treaty was concluded, on 12 February 1685 Sawant opened his campaign against Sambhaji, sending his fleet into the Vengurla creek and carrying off a considerable amount of plunder. On learning of this, Sambhaji hurried down into the Konkan and marched against Sawant, and for a time this checked him. In a letter dated 24 January 1686 the governor reports: "We have concluded a separate treaty with Khem Sawant of Kudal, and we have given Sambhaji a sharp warning. In the whole of the Goa province, Sambhaji now holds only Fonda; the territory near Vasai, including Kamandurg and the like, which had passed to Sambhaji, we have taken back." The fort of Asheri, which had formerly belonged to the Portuguese and had lately been seized by Sambhaji, was likewise retaken by them in October 1687. Step by step, Sambhaji's position continued to weaken. Discord had by now also broken out between Kavikalash and Peshwa Nilopant, splitting the court into two factions — and it was this very discord that did more than anything else to consume Sambhaji's strength from within.

6) बादशहाशी पहिला सामना :-

For the sake of chronology, we must now turn back a little. From 1681 onward, for a full four years, Sambhaji fought a determined struggle against the Badshah, and for convenience of narration this may be divided into two parts. The first, running up to the monsoon of 1683, was an especially intense contest, for in it both Sambhaji and Akbar exerted themselves to the very limit of their strength; in the second, Akbar played little part. Hasan Ali Khan, one of Aurangzeb's commanders who had won distinction and favour in the Rajputana campaigns, was sent by the Badshah against Sambhaji in 1681 with a force of fourteen thousand crack cavalry. His orders were to seize Sambhaji's northern Konkan territory from Junnar to Kalyan, for Sambhaji at that time was preoccupied fighting the Siddi of Janjira, leaving the northern Konkan exposed. Hasan Ali Khan descended into the Konkan by way of the Naneghat pass; the Maratha army attempted to block him but was brushed aside, and he pressed on to capture Kalyan (30 January 1682). Serving under Hasan Ali was a Rajput sardar named Dalpat Bundela, whose written accounts of this period have survived. Hasan Ali then spent three or four months wreaking considerable havoc in the region, but with the onset of the monsoon he climbed back up the ghat and withdrew. Bahadurkhan, in support of this operation, had encamped at Pedgaon, and both commanders were under strict orders from the Badshah to seize Sambhaji's territory wherever the opportunity arose. The moment the Mughal forces turned back, the Marathas retook Kalyan.

6) बादशहाशी पहिला सामना :-

When Hasan Ali first advanced, Sambhaji had been occupied with the Janjira campaign; leaving ten thousand troops there, he came to Raigad in February 1682, fearing that Hasan Ali might march from Kalyan directly against his own capital, and stationed garrisons at Chaul, Nagothane and other points to guard against this. Up on the plateau, too, he strung out lines of troops post by post as far as Satara. The Badshah himself then came in person to Aurangabad, and at once sent his son Azam Shah and Dilerkhan toward Nagar, and Shihabuddinkhan and Dalpat Bundela toward Nashik, with orders to seize Maratha territory and forts. Shihabuddin took several posts along his route and, in April 1682, laid siege to the fort of Ramsej — an engagement that deserves to be especially remembered. Ramsej fort, seven miles north of Nashik, was defended by its keeledar with such consummate skill that it never fell to the Mughals. To bring his cannon to bear on the fort, Shihabuddinkhan had a tall platform built on the facing hill, but to no avail. As one contemporary account puts it: "The enemy built earthworks and pressed the siege hard; but Keso Trimal Peshwe, stationed at Trimbakgad, kept up the supply of provisions, and Harbhat lent his assistance. The fort held out for six months and was never taken, so that the Badshah recalled Shabdikhan [Shihabuddinkhan]." The Marathas made repeated sallies from the fort against the Mughals and drove them back time and again; the keeledar and havaldar of Ramsej performed feats of extraordinary valour. The Badshah's fury at this failure was such that he recalled Shihabuddin and sent Bahadurkhan in his place, Dalpat Bundela remaining there throughout. The Mughals launched assault after fierce assault on the fort, but the Marathas beat back every one, hurling down stones, arrows and fire-balls upon the attackers and throwing them into complete disarray. In the end the Mughal forces were compelled to lift the siege and withdraw (October 1682) — a bitter blow to the Badshah. Just at this juncture, the Maratha senapati Hambirrao Mohite, marching with ten thousand troops to relieve Ramsej, encountered the retreating Mughal forces; a battle followed, in which Hambirrao was defeated.

6) बादशहाशी पहिला सामना :-

Seeing that his efforts availed nothing against Sambhaji, Aurangzeb's fury grew still more intense. He is said to have flung his turban to the ground in rage and declared, "Until I bring about Sambhaji's downfall, I shall never wear this turban again" (30 July 1682). From this point on he set in motion extraordinary measures aimed at Sambhaji's utter destruction. He cut off the assistance that the Adilshah of Bijapur had been giving to Sambhaji, and sought instead to persuade the Adilshah to attack Sambhaji from the Miraj side, sending vakils to Bijapur and offering a large sum of money to secure his cooperation. But this scheme came to nothing, for by now it had become obvious to everyone that once Sambhaji fell, the Badshah's mace would next descend upon them — and so the Adilshah, for his own safety, chose instead to render Sambhaji whatever assistance he could. Aurangzeb accordingly sent his son Azam Shah specifically to guard the Bijapur frontier, stationed Ruhullakhan and Muizuddin in the Nagar district to keep watch on Sambhaji, transferred Shihabuddinkhan to Junnar, and sent Ranmustakhan down into the Konkan. With this, Sambhaji's kingdom lay encircled by the Badshah's forces on every side save one — the southern gateway through Sawantwadi and Goa — and arrangements were made to have the Portuguese block that gateway as well, which is why Sambhaji was first compelled to deal with the Portuguese before he could face the Badshah directly. By the monsoon of 1682 all these arrangements were complete, and the moment the weather cleared, the Mughal armies surged out in force. In November, Ranmustakhan entered northern Konkan and seized its chief post, Kalyan. On hearing this, Sambhaji sent Nilopant Moreshwar Pingle and Rupaji Bhosale to defend it, but Ranmustakhan advanced and defeated them. A second Maratha force marched toward Nashik, where it was met by Khan Jahan. Just then the Badshah learned that Shahzada Akbar, at the head of a large Maratha force, was advancing toward Bidar, and sent his grandson Muizuddin and Khan Jahan against him. They hastened by way of the Godavari and Nanded toward Bidar, when word arrived that Sambhaji's men had driven off the Badshah's own elephants, then grazing near Pathri. Khan Jahan at once turned back, and a running, harrying battle with the Marathas dragged on for many days before he succeeded in recovering the elephants. During this episode Maratha forces raided as far as Chanda, deep within Golkonda territory, and Khan Jahan and his men suffered terribly trying to keep pace with them. This occurred in the summer of 1683.

6) बादशहाशी पहिला सामना :-

Ranmustakhan held Kalyan, but both he and his troops suffered severe difficulty in provisioning themselves. The Badshah sent supplies with Ruhullakhan and had materials shipped from Surat, and only in this way did the garrison at Kalyan manage to hold out. Hasan Ali Khan, meanwhile, marching from Bahadurgad toward Parenda, was met by Sambhaji's army; a battle followed near Phaltan, in which Hasan Ali was wounded. At the same time Shahzada Azam had marched into Adilshahi territory and encamped at Dharur, leaving his harem there under guard while he pressed his attack on Sambhaji's territory. Sambhaji's forces engaged him with feints and evasive skirmishing, but one Maratha detachment suddenly struck at Azam's harem camp at Dharur itself. There, under the guard of the Rajput sardar Aniruddhsinh Hada, was Jahanzeb, also known as Jani Begum, daughter of Dara Shukoh and wife of Azam Shah. Panic erupted in the camp the moment word came that the Marathas were attacking; in this crisis the Begum herself threw off her veil, mounted a horse, mustered whatever troops she could find, and met the Marathas in fierce battle. For a brief span a bloody engagement raged; Aniruddhsinh fought to the very limit of his strength and lost nine hundred men, while the Marathas too suffered heavy casualties. The Begum herself remained in the front line throughout, and in this way succeeded in driving the Marathas back and saving her camp. Though wounded, Aniruddhsinh had shown such disregard for his own life in the valour he displayed that the Begum, in admiration, took the precious pearl necklace from her own throat and placed it around his neck. This took place in March 1683. Azam Shah, then encamped on the banks of the Nira, was delighted to hear of his wife's exploit. In June the Badshah summoned him to Aurangabad; he likewise recalled Ruhullakhan and Ranmustakhan from Kalyan province. On their way back from the Konkan by the Titwala ghat toward Nagar, the only route available to them was a narrow and difficult path, and the Marathas, who were well informed of their movements, lay in wait in ambush along it. The moment Ruhullakhan's party came into view, the Marathas showered them with arrows. In this skirmish the wounded son of the leading Maratha commander fell, badly hurt, into Ruhullakhan's hands. The Khan had his wounds treated and asked him, "Whose son are you?" — but the valiant boy would not even reveal his name. The Marathas offered a ransom of up to two lakh rupees for his release, but the Khan refused to accept it. What became of the boy afterward remains unknown; in all likelihood he spent the rest of his life a Mughal captive. After this first skirmish, when the Khan resumed his march, he found that some thirty-five thousand Marathas had blocked every ghat and pathway through the mountains before him. Ranmustakhan, too, found himself trapped in another difficult pass and unable to reach Ruhullakhan; starvation began to set in among his men. Ruhullakhan managed, through various inducements, to persuade the Portuguese garrisons at Vasai and elsewhere to bring him a little provender by ship, and he appealed to the Badshah as well for aid — but the Badshah showed him no pity. "You have eight thousand cavalry with you," he said, "is that not enough? You are holding the Maratha commander's son in your custody — use him to secure your own safety." Such was the humiliation that Sambhaji had by now managed to inflict upon the Badshah's own grandees.

7) महाराष्ट्रााच्या पिशाच्चभूमीत बादशहाची विवंचना :-

Across the vast expanse stretching from Kalyan, Aurangabad, Chanda and Bidar down to Raigad itself, Sambhaji, as described above, carried on for a full year a truly extraordinary struggle against the mighty Badshah — a feat to which history offers few parallels. It is a matter of real regret that no account of this struggle survives anywhere in Marathi records; amid such turmoil, evidently, no one found the leisure to set pen to paper. What little we know of Sambhaji's reign comes to us only from foreign sources — English and Portuguese hearsay reports, or Mughal court news-bulletins (akhbars) — these are essentially our only materials. In Marathi there exists only the Chitnisi Bakhar, and even that was written a full hundred and twenty-five years after Sambhaji's time. We know today how badly distorted an account can become even when it is written down from hearsay just a fortnight or a month after the event itself. How, then, can we expect to know with any accuracy, two hundred and fifty years later, the exploits of Maratha heroes carried out across hundreds of miles of territory? The Mughal akhbaras themselves often appear thoroughly unreliable. In short, we must bear firmly in mind that no true and complete history of Sambhaji's reign, or of Akbar's movements during this period, is available to us today.

7) महाराष्ट्रााच्या पिशाच्चभूमीत बादशहाची विवंचना :-

One fact, however, is beyond dispute: despite pouring his vast resources against Sambhaji for a full year, the Badshah saw absolutely no result from it. On the contrary, in numerous places the Marathas caught the Mughals and destroyed them outright. Witnessing all this, Aurangzeb became convinced that subduing Sambhaji was nowhere near as easy a matter as he had imagined. His long-standing suspicion that his soldiers were shirking their duty now proved entirely groundless. Realising that the war could not be brought to a conclusion by his existing methods, he summoned all his commanders from their various posts to confer with him in person during the monsoon of 1683, in the hope of settling on some new approach. But what new approach, indeed, could he decide upon? His mind fell into a state bordering on derangement. Akbar was openly at war with him; and rumour had spread everywhere that his eldest son, Shah Alam, had gone over to the Marathas. He no longer knew whom he could trust and whom he could not. By May his state of mind had grown so troubled that he ceased to feel confident even of his own life, living in constant dread that an assassin might strike him down at any moment, and finding no peace of mind whatsoever. For a brief while he even resolved to somehow quit this "land of demons" that the Marathas — sheer devils, in his eyes — had made of Maharashtra. But no one was willing to remain behind in the Deccan and stand firm against Sambhaji in his absence. He implored his eldest son to take on this responsibility, to which the son replied, "Bring Amir Khan here from Afghanistan and place him under my command, and then I shall accept the task" — leaving matters, as the saying goes, with "no one to do the work, so Saturday bears the blame." Yet to withdraw Amir Khan risked the loss of Afghanistan itself — and this dilemma left the Badshah at his wits' end.

7) महाराष्ट्रााच्या पिशाच्चभूमीत बादशहाची विवंचना :-

Western writings of the time paint a vivid picture of the Badshah's state of mind. In a letter dated 19 June 1683, an Englishman at Surat writes: "The Badshah's mind has become deranged. It changes from one moment to the next. All his nobles have grown thoroughly displeased with him. Things will only settle once his eyes are closed [in death]; otherwise some harm is bound to come to him. Most of his own people are inclined toward Shahzada Akbar." A further letter, dated 2 October, continues: "There is no telling what the Badshah will do from one moment to the next. He has become so irritable that he will listen to no one. Day and night, Akbar is before his eyes. He has convinced himself that Azam Shah, his wife Jani Begum, and Dilerkhan all favour Akbar, and has punished them without just cause. No one feels safe for even a moment. It appears that the Rajput kings intend to help Akbar overthrow the Badshah. Should the Badshah happen to die at this juncture, there is every likelihood of general chaos." Manucci and other well-informed writers of the period record much the same impression. Bhimsen writes: "The Badshah had sent Azam Shah and Dilerkhan to guard the Nagar district; suspecting that they had gone over to Akbar, he sent them an urgent order: 'Come to me at once, whatever state you are in.' Their delay in obeying provoked the Badshah's fury beyond measure, and he inflicted a harsh punishment on Dilerkhan." Ishwardas Nagar writes further: "When the Badshah's summons reached Azam Shah, he went that same night to Dilerkhan's tent to see him, and the two conferred together for four hours. This secret meeting was at once reported to the Badshah by his spies. On reading their report, he removed Azam Shah from his command and summoned all his subordinate officers to his own presence; they duly arrived at Ahmednagar. Azam Shah, enraged beyond measure at his father over this, dismissed all his own attendants and shut himself away alone in his quarters, grieving and receiving no one. Dilerkhan, for his part, took poison and died. The Badshah subsequently went in person to Azam Shah and consoled him (20 September 1683)." The story of Dilerkhan's career is already familiar to the reader. This Rohilla sardar had been raised in the service of Dara Shukoh; when Aurangzeb marched up from the Deccan against his brother, Dilerkhan abandoned Dara's cause and went over to Aurangzeb's side in the very midst of the fighting. From that day forward, if any commander served Badshah Aurangzeb with absolute, unwavering loyalty, it was this very Dilerkhan. It was on his word that sardars of the stature of Jaisingh fell out of the Badshah's favour and suffered disgrace. Between Shah Alam and Dilerkhan, moreover, there had long been open hostility. In short, that a sardar as loyal and capable as Dilerkhan should in the end have had to swallow poison to escape further humiliation is in itself the sharpest possible indictment of that Badshah's sense of loyalty and justice toward his own servants. It was through misrule of precisely this kind that the Mughal empire was ultimately brought to ruin.

8) बादशहाशी दुसरा निकराचा सामना (सन 1683-85) :-

Seeing that an entire year's campaign had yielded no result whatsoever, the Badshah's mind was filled with deep frustration. In the monsoon of 1683, as already related, he summoned his commanders to Aurangabad for a personal conference. He began by placating his disgruntled sardars and his slack, wavering sons, and then reorganised the whole campaign from scratch, assigning each man a clearly defined task. Since it was the Portuguese who had been sustaining the Badshah's cause along the western coast, Sambhaji had struck at Chaul and at Goa; and since Akbar too seemed bent on escaping abroad by way of Goa, the Badshah now shifted the focus of his main campaign away from the Kalyan side of northern Konkan and toward Sawantwadi in the south. The plan was to hem Sambhaji in and surround him from that direction. Around 15 September he sent his eldest son Shah Alam south, fully equipped and provisioned, and in November he himself moved further south still, taking up his own headquarters at Ahmednagar to support the operation.

8) बादशहाशी दुसरा निकराचा सामना (सन 1683-85) :-

Even as the Portuguese and Sawant rose against Sambhaji from the south, Shah Alam simultaneously set out from the north by way of Ramghat to descend into the Konkan. A second force under Shihabuddinkhan marched on Pune, then descended into the Konkan and plundered Nizampur (27 December 1683). Aurangzeb sent his son Azam Shah by way of Baglan and Khandesh toward Nashik, to keep a watch on Akbar; and to cut off any assistance that might reach Sambhaji from Bijapur or Golkonda, he stationed Khan Jahan in that quarter. He also gave the Goans his personal assurance: "Fight Sambhaji Raje with all your strength; our army is on its way to your aid." The Portuguese, for their part, undertook to keep Shah Alam's army supplied with grain and ammunition. And in case Shah Alam should falter, the Badshah sent a further capable commander, Hasan Ali Khan, from Bahadurgad, who joined Shah Alam's forces near Belgaum. Two renowned sardars, Ranmustakhan and Daudkhan Khuresi, were placed by the Badshah at the head of Hasan Ali's advance guard — so thorough were these preparations that Sambhaji was to be given no opportunity whatsoever to slip away in any direction. Ranmustakhan and Daudkhan duly seized Sambhaji's posts at Shahapur, Sampgaon and elsewhere, gathering considerable plunder in the process. In December 1683 Shah Alam descended by way of Ramghat into the territory of Sawantwadi, his army suffering severely as it made its way through the mountainous terrain; Hasan Ali remained encamped at the head of the ghat to secure it. Sambhaji at this time had gone directly against Goa, and so could not return in time to block the Mughals in the ghat itself. The moment word reached him of Shah Alam's advance, he called off his campaign against the Portuguese; and the Portuguese, for their part, were by now so exhausted that a settlement with Sambhaji was reached without much delay. Entrusting this peacemaking to Kalusha, Sambhaji hurriedly lifted the siege of Goa and rushed back to confront Shah Alam. A great pitched battle followed between the two, with immense loss of life on both sides, though it proved inconclusive. On 13 December 1683 Sambhaji withdrew first toward Raigad — probably out of fear that Shihabuddinkhan might strike at his capital in his absence. Shah Alam, for his part, was in any case unable to intercept him.

8) बादशहाशी दुसरा निकराचा सामना (सन 1683-85) :-

Akbar was, at this time, encamped at Dicholi. On 15 January 1684 Shah Alam marched on Dicholi with a force numbering sixty thousand infantry, forty thousand cavalry, twenty thousand camels and nineteen hundred elephants. Three days later, one hundred and twenty Mughal vessels arrived at Goa carrying provisions for this army — but the Goans, fearing Sambhaji's revenge, refused to let this supply reach Shah Alam, telling him: "Should we deliver grain to you, Sambhaji will not fail to take his revenge upon us." The Shahzada, who had an inflated notion of his own strength, was infuriated by this refusal and began laying waste to Portuguese territory. For a brief while it seemed to many that he would go on to seize Goa itself. In his fury he burned Sambhaji's towns of Kudal, Banda, Dicholi and Malvan, and plundered the trading port of Vengurla — but beyond this he was, in the end, forced to retreat. Akbar meanwhile fled to Fonda. Shah Alam's army was enormous, and with the grain shipment from Surat denied him, his men began to suffer terribly. Sambhaji's watchful eye, meanwhile, missed nothing anywhere in his kingdom; on 3 January 1684 he is found writing to the Deshmukh of Wai in these terms: "Sultan Muazzam [Shah Alam] and Shabdikhan [Shihabuddinkhan], the enemy, have descended into the Konkan from both directions. At this juncture troops are urgently required. I have accordingly sent Santaji and Yesaji up into the ghats to raise a levy of troops; follow their instructions exactly and send down the levy accordingly. Once you have a solid body of troops assembled with you, what cause is there to fear the enemy — he will surely be destroyed. Until now the Swami has looked after your interests; prove yourself worthy of that now, in these very days, and see to the Swami's satisfaction, so that the Swami may be pleased with you. Set your mind at ease." Acting on this order, troops were duly raised, and considerable resistance was offered to the Mughals as a result.

8) बादशहाशी दुसरा निकराचा सामना (सन 1683-85) :-

March came, and with it the heat of summer. Shihabuddinkhan, who had gone as far as Raigad laying waste to Sambhaji's territory along the way, now turned south to join forces with the Shahzada — but Sambhaji made sure the two never met. In the Shahzada's camp, meanwhile, men and beasts alike began to perish of starvation; the Siddi of Janjira managed to send through a little grain, but how far could that go toward meeting so vast a need? The Shahzada was accordingly forced to turn back and climb once more up the Ramghat pass, and it was in that harsh and difficult terrain that an epidemic broke out among his troops, carrying off fully a third of his men. Horses, camels and elephants died in such numbers that the stench polluted the entire countryside and left people gasping for breath. With their animals dead, everyone — high and low alike — was reduced to marching on foot; heat and thirst left the survivors looking like walking corpses. In April, news of his son's catastrophe reached the Badshah, and he at once dispatched fresh supplies under Ruhullakhan. With this relief, the army slowly, painfully climbed back up out of the Konkan. Watching the Mughals' misery, Sambhaji's men spared no effort in launching further stealthy raids to compound their suffering. After enduring such terrible hardship, bearing such humiliation, and losing very nearly everything he had brought with him, this crown prince of the Badshah finally reached his father at Ahmednagar on 18 May 1684. In sum, from this vast and painstakingly assembled campaign, the Badshah, in a full year, achieved nothing beyond the burning of a handful of Sambhaji's villages. Seeing that his efforts could make no headway against Sambhaji, the Badshah grew deeply disheartened. That year, despite the most rigorous preparation, Mughal armies had pressed into Sambhaji's kingdom from every quarter, and yet the Badshah had failed to win even a single significant victory. On one occasion, when some 112 of Sambhaji's leading commanders and men fell into Mughal hands in the Konkan, the Badshah, in his fury, had every one of them put to death outright — even though it is nowhere the custom to execute prisoners taken in war without particular cause. Thus, while Sambhaji and Akbar carried on the fight each in his own way, the Badshah, encamped in Maharashtra with so vast a retinue, found his expenses mounting enormously while the whole countryside around him was reduced to ruin, and his burden growing heavier with each passing day. At last, with the thought that he might at least recover his outlay from some other quarter, he turned his attention away from Maharashtra for the time being and resolved instead to conquer the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda.